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Abstract
For-profit hospitals’ market share has increased in many nations over recent decades. Previous studies suggest that their
growth is not attributable to superior performance on access, quality of care, or efficiency. We analyzed other factors that
we hypothesized may contribute to the increasing role of for-profit hospitals. We studied the historical development of the
for-profit hospital sector across 4 nations with contrasting trends in for-profit hospital market share: the United States, the
United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands. We focused on 3 factors that we believed might help explain why the role
of for-profits grew in some nations but not in others: (1) the treatment of for-profits by public reimbursement plans, (2)
physicians’ financial interests, and (3) the effect of the political environment. We conclude that access to subsidies and
reimbursement under favorable terms from public health care payors is an important factor in the rise of for-profit hospitals.
Arrangements that aligned financial incentives of physicians with the interests of for-profit hospitals were important in
stimulating for-profit growth in an earlier era, but they play little role at present. Remarkably, the environment for for-profit
ownership seems to have been largely immune to political shifts.
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In recent decades, for-profit hospitals have gained
market share throughout many developed nations.
Conventional wisdom may attribute for-profit hospital
success to greater efficiency.1–3 However, we argue that
this claim is based on unfounded assumptions, and we
analyze the growth and development of the for-profit
hospital sector in 4 countries in order to explore alter-
native explanations.
Hospital Ownership: Public, Nonprofit, and
For-Profit
Many nations’ health systems include a variety of hos-
pital ownership types: for-profit, nonprofit, and public.
Public hospitals are legally part of the government,
either as state-owned organizations at arm’s length or
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fully owned by regional or local governments.4
Nonprofit hospitals must use any surpluses (or profits)
to further their organizational purposes or missions, and
they are barred from distributing surpluses to individu-
als who exercise control over them.5 Conversely, for-
profit hospital owners control their organizations and
have the right to all “residual claims” (i.e., the profits)
after all prior obligations have been paid.6
The for-profit hospital sector comes in many shapes
and sizes, ranging from small, physician-owned institu-
tions to large, publicly traded for-profit hospital chains.
Increasingly, small, individual for-profit hospitals are
being consolidated into (very) large investor-owned
chains.7 Depending on country context and regulation,
for-profits often specialize in lucrative areas of care, such
as elective surgery,8 and are more likely to target private-
pay (or privately insured) patients.9
Kenneth Arrow,10 a founding father of health eco-
nomics, argued that fundamental information asymme-
tries in health care markets mandate reliance on
trustworthy agents to compensate for market failures.
He suggested that for-profit organizations cannot satisfy
this standard because “[t]he very word, ‘profit,’ is a
signal that denies the trust relations” (p.965).10
Following this line of thought, one may believe that non-
profits, with a status signaling that their objectives are
not to maximize profits, might therefore be best suited to
act in the interest of patients. However, in another health
economics classic, Pauly and Redisch11 postulate that
shrinkages in the U.S. proprietary hospital sector reflect
powerful physician interests, because nonprofit hospitals
operate as de facto doctors’ facilities and are effectively
for-profits in disguise, whereby physicians exercise
authority over hospital assets in order to maximize
their income without running financial risks.
Both Arrow’s10 and Pauly and Redisch’s11 analyses
suggest that nonprofits would dominate the hospital
sector. However, several countries on different conti-
nents have seen an expansion in the for-profit hospital
market in recent years.12–15 This growth in for-profit
share of the hospital sector raises puzzling questions.
Why Is It That For-Profit Hospitals Do Not
Deliver Superior Performance?
Many economists hold that for-profit ownership is nat-
urally more efficient because in theory, these institutions
must continuously strive to outperform nonprofit or
public organizations in order to maximize profit and sat-
isfy their shareholders.11,16–18 However, empirical evi-
dence contradicts this. Systematic reviews analyzing the
relationship between hospital ownership and quality of
care have either found mixed results9,19,20 or have
favored nonprofit or public providers.21,22 Reviews of
hospital efficiency have arrived at the same conclusion:
There are mixed results, but generally, for-profit pro-
viders do not outperform other ownership
types.9,21,23For-profit hospitals tend to charge higher
prices than public and nonprofit hospitals.19,23,24 This,
in part, may reflect their wider profit margins25,26 and
higher overhead and capital expenditures.27–30 Despite
higher costs to the payor, for-profit hospitals often out-
source and are thus able to minimize the number of
employed staff – particularly non-physician staff.31 As
a result, for-profit hospitals typically benefit from lower
personnel costs.
Interpreting empirical findings on this topic requires
the consideration of 3 important nuances. First, many
systematic reviews on this subject have highlighted the
complexities around drawing conclusions9,23,32–34 when
there is substantial variability within different ownership
types.20 Second, exogenous economic incentives might at
times override provider missions and goals. For
instance, spillover effects can impact and alter the
motives of nonprofit organizations. Such spillovers
might be beneficial or detrimental. For example, for-
profit providers’ entry in the market might push non-
profits to adopt similar structures and strategies.35,36
Nonprofit hospitals may feel pressured to increase their
efficiency or to focus on profitable services such as elec-
tive surgeries and minimize charity care.25,37–41 Third,
while some cross-sectional studies have found that for-
profits are less efficient because they tend to acquire inef-
ficient public and nonprofit organizations,9 other longi-
tudinal studies suggest that for-profit entities streamline
the public and nonprofit hospitals they acquire and
thereby achieve greater efficiency.26,33
Research Questions
If, as the literature suggests, consistently superior perfor-
mance on patient outcomes or economic efficiency does
not explain the growth of for-profit hospitals, other fac-
tors must be explored.
How Does Access to Capital and Payment for Services
Vary by Hospital Ownership Type?
All hospitals require access to capital funds for invest-
ments into new or upgraded facilities that are essential
for growth and even survival; however, they depend
upon different sources for these capital funds. For-
profits can attract capital from investors who seek a
share of the earnings (i.e., venture capital firms and the
stock market) and can also raise funds through bank
loans or by issuing bonds.42 Nonprofits can tap into
philanthropic funds, receive government grants, issue
(tax-exempt) bonds, and retain earnings from operating
surpluses.42,43 On the whole, nonprofit organizations’
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financing costs are lower.39 However, in some circum-
stances, for-profits have an advantage: For example, a
for-profit hospital with a high stock-price-to-earnings
ratio may yield more by raising capital through stock
sales rather than by borrowing.39,44,45 In other words,
the relative costs of different sources of capital fluctuate,
and such fluctuation can turn the tables in defining
which ownership type has a financing advantage.
Furthermore, the growth of the for-profit sector may
be hindered if government-regulated health financing
plans limit or disfavor them.
How Do Physician Incentives and Influence Vary
Across Different Types of Hospital Ownership?
Physicians often exert considerable influence over hospi-
tal management46 and a hospital’s business prospects.47
While many factors shape physician working conditions
and job satisfaction, remuneration certainly plays a role.
For-profit entities may offer physicians higher pay (e.g.,
in the form of an ownership stake in the firm),28 but they
may also reduce (non-)physician employee pay in order
to maximize profits. This incentive structure is absent or
may be weaker in nonprofit organizations. Employment
in nonprofit organizations might be attractive to physi-
cians because of commitments to social and altruistic
goals.5,48 For some physicians who recognize that (as
Pauly and Redisch noted) nonprofit hospitals can be
for-profits in disguise, the attraction of a nonprofit hos-
pital might be linked to physicians’ desires to maximize
their incomes.11
Does the Ruling Political Party Determine the Success
of Different Hospital Ownership Types?
Political theory would predict that left-leaning govern-
ment regimes are more likely to be anti-commercial and
hence to implement public policies that disfavor for-
profits. In contrast, theory predicts that right-leaning
politicians are more apt to trust market forces in
health care and to implement for-profit-friendly health
policies.
Structure of the Article
In this article, we examine the role of these 3 factors in
the for-profit hospital market. We consider: (a) public
policies granting access to capital and payments for
services, (b) physicians’ stake in for-profit medical
enterprises, and (c) the political milieu, and we com-
pare these trends in for-profit market growth in 4 coun-
tries. Below, we outline the methods and data that
inform our study; we then present an overview of the
trends of for-profit market share across the 4 countries
over time; following this, we delve deeper into our 4
case studies and demonstrate the similarities and dif-
ferences across the for-profit hospital sector in these
countries; finally, we discuss the lessons learned and
policy implications of our findings and offer several
conclusions.
Methods and Case Selection
We conducted a historical case study of the growth and
characteristics of the for-profit hospital sector and health
care environment in 4 nations (Table 1). We included
cases with substantial (Germany and the United
States) as well as negligible (the Netherlands) for-profit
sectors. Our cases cover the spectrum of health financing
systems: mainly privately funded (United States), pub-
licly funded (United Kingdom), and those funded by
social insurance (Germany and the Netherlands). These
4 cases can also be stratified in such a way that they are
relevant in answering our research questions. The
United Kingdom and Germany both rely on public cap-
ital subsidies and regulation. These are centralized in the
United Kingdom and decentralized in Germany.
Hospital capital (and debt repayment) in both the
United States and the Netherlands is largely funded by
operating surpluses that hospitals generate internally
from reimbursement fees paid by insurers for care pro-
vided. Hospital physicians are mainly paid salaries in
both Germany and the United Kingdom. Until recently,
these physicians in the United States were typically self-
employed; in the Netherlands, about half of hospital
physicians are self-employed and half are salaried.49
Political discussion on the appropriateness of for-profit
hospitals has arisen in previous decades. It was promi-
nent in the United Kingdom during the mid-1970s; in the
United States during the 1980s (and again, regarding
physician-owned specialty hospitals from the early
2000s onward); in Germany in the early 1990s; and in
the Netherlands in the first 10 years after the 2006 health
care market reform.
We collected data on the for-profit hospital sectors in
4 nations using official statistics, secondary sources, gray
literature, and peer-reviewed studies.
Results
For-Profit Hospital Market Share: Overview of Findings
Figure 1 displays trends in for-profit share of hospital
beds in each nation and the political leanings of the
governments over time. For-profit market share has
grown rapidly in Germany and the United States, cur-
rently exceeding 15% in each of these nations. In the
United Kingdom, growth has been more modest, and
private hospital beds currently account for 5% of the
total (U.K. figures are for all non-National Health
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Service [NHS] hospitals, including nonprofits such as
Nuffield and London Clinic, which accounted for
12.9% of private hospital beds in 2018).51 In the
Netherlands, only a single hospital remained under for-
profit ownership following the 2018 bankruptcy of 2
hospitals that had been acquired by commercial
investors.
Because for-profit hospitals are generally smaller than
nonprofit and public hospitals, their market share as
measured by the number of hospitals is higher than
their share of beds: These shares are 26.7% in the
United States in 2018 (up from 17.9% in 2000) and
35.8% in Germany (up from 21.7% in 2000) (authors’
Figure 1. Trends in for-profit hospitals’ share of total beds in each nation, and the political leanings of the ruling party during each period.a
aAuthors’ calculations. Figures reflect inpatient (acute care) beds. The Dutch figures reflect the acquisition of three hospitals by a commercial firm, but
because missing data on acquisition dates, the graph may be imprecise.
Sources: AHA (2017)50, CDC (2017)55, OECD (2019)52, OHE (2011)56, LaingBuisson (2017)57, LaingBuisson (2019)51, Statistisches Bundesamt (2018)53,
CIBG (2020)54
Table 1. Characteristics of the Health Systems and Size of the For-Profit Hospital Sector in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany,
and the Netherlands.
U.S. U.K. Germany Netherlands
Number of for-profit
hospitals
(% of total)
[Year]
1,645
(26.6%)
[2015]
195a
(11.1%)
[2014]
720
(37.1%)
[2017]
1b
(1.4%)
[2018]
For-profit beds
(% of total)
[Year]
173,758
(18.5%)
[2015]
8,730c
(5.0%)
[2018]
93,189
(18.7%)
[2017]
257b
(0.7%)
[2018]
Health system Private with public programs National Health Service Social-insurance Social-insurance
Capital funding Mainly operating surpluses Public subsidies Mainly public subsidies Mainly operating surpluses
Physician employment
status
Mainly self-employed
until recently, currently mixed
Salary / self-employed
(private sector)
Salary Self-employed / salary
Explicit political
debate
Effects of profit making (1980s),
cherry picking by specialty
hospitals (2000s)
NHS pay-beds (1970s)
and outsourcing to the
private sector (1980s)
Privatization of hospitals
in former German
Democratic Republic (1990s)
Lifting ban on profit
distribution (2008–2019)
Sources: AHA,50 LaingBuisson,51 OECD,52 Statistisches Bundesamt,53 and CIBG.54
aThese figures reflect all non-NHS hospitals and exclude day facility-only private hospitals.
bTwo hospitals owned by private investors that went bankrupt in 2018 are excluded from the table.
cThese figures reflect all beds in the independent acute medical care hospitals.
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calculations; no comparable data are available for the
United Kingdom).50,53
Surprisingly, for-profit hospital growth rates in the
United States and Germany appear largely unrelated
to the political leanings of the governing party. For-
profit growth in the United Kingdom coincided with
the vogue for New Public Management (NPM) starting
in the late 1980s. While it is difficult to define left- vs.
right-leaning in the Dutch or German context because
these governments are sometimes (i.e., Germany) or
always (i.e., Netherlands) coalitions between parties,
political milieu appeared to have little relation to for-
profit hospital growth. The indicated political leanings
of the Dutch government in Figure 1 are based on the
largest party in the coalition in each period.
The Early Roots of the For-Profit Hospital
Sector
In the late 19th century, almshouses (United Kingdom),
philanthropic institutions (United States), and religious
providers (Netherlands and the United States) that had
previously provided medical care to the destitute began
to be replaced by modern hospitals with sophisticated
operating theaters and diagnostic equipment that
catered to patients of all economic backgrounds.12
Most of these early hospitals were publicly or church-
owned facilities located in city centers. In bigger cities,
many hospitals limited admitting privileges to a small
group of physicians, which stimulated the growth of
physician-owned clinics that tended to target wealthier
patients. However, the financial prospects of the emerg-
ing for-profit hospital sector were lackluster. They could
neither tap into low-cost charitable or public sources of
capital nor could they use cheap religious labor such as
nuns, and public payments for care of the poor were
meager.
The 1930s depression dealt a major blow to the for-
profit hospital sector in many nations.12 While data is
limited, we know that in Germany, proprietary hospi-
tals’ share of beds declined from 7.0% in 1931 to 5.9% in
1937.58 In the United Kingdom, 9.6% of all beds were in
private nursing homes in 1921, declining to 7.2% in
1938.59 U.S. proprietary facilities accounted for 17.3%
of hospital beds in 1928, but no more than 9.5% in
1940.12
Shortly after World War II, many Western countries
developed or cemented their welfare states, increased
public expenditures on health care, and, in several
cases, implemented universal health coverage.60
However, in most nations, the expanded public financing
of health care afforded only a marginal role to for-profit
hospitals, casting a shadow over this sector. The eclipse
of for-profit hospitals that prevailed at the time of
Arrow’s and Pauly and Redisch’s11 analyses led them
to conclude that nonprofits would remain dominant in
the health care sector. With the benefit of hindsight, it
seems these eminent scholars miscalculated.
The United States
Medicare and Medicaid Capital Payment Policies. In the
United States, the proprietary hospital sector bottomed
out in the early 1960s, and its renewed growth coincided
with the start-up of Medicare (1965) and Medicaid
(1966). This was no coincidence: Both programs created
huge financial opportunities for hospitals, particularly
for for-profits.
Medicare, which covered persons age 65 and over,
paid hospitals for their operating costs, with a 2%
add-on for future “capital improvements” and addition-
al payments for existing capital costs (such as interest on
debts and depreciation).61 While the Hill-Burton pro-
gram that provided massive federal grants for hospital
construction starting in 1946 barred for-profit hospitals
from participating,62,63 Medicare (and most state
Medicaid programs, which cover some of the poor)
offered for-profits extra payments that were unavailable
to nonprofit or public facilities. This additional capital
payment for return on investment was set at 1.5 times
the rate of return earned by Medicare’s Hospital
Insurance Trust Fund.12 This proviso, inserted at the
insistence of the nursing home industry, virtually guar-
anteed for-profit facilities a “risk-free” investment
return.61
Medicare’s and Medicaid’s capital payment policies
spurred the rapid growth of hospital firms such as
HCA (previously Hospital Corporation of America),
which was founded in 1960 and by 1980 owned about
300 hospitals with 40,000 beds. Much of that growth
came from acquisitions that were effectively subsidized
by the public program, which (in addition to the gener-
ous payments discussed above) reimbursed for-profits
for their interest payments on debts incurred to purchase
additional hospitals.64,65 Moreover, tax laws permitted
owners of hospital buildings to claim accelerated depre-
ciation over a 15-year period. These measures assured
for-profit hospitals of ready and cheap access to funds
for new investments. By the early 1980s, for-profit pro-
viders were receiving 40% of all capital reimbursements
nationally, although they accounted for only 7.6% of
total hospital expenses.64 This favorable public reim-
bursement plan stimulated the creation of new hospitals
and the consolidation of the for-profit sector (Table 2).
Market-Driven Health Care Reforms During the Reagan
Administration. The Reagan Administration’s (1981–
1989) health policies were driven by its stated desire to
reduce government spending and introduce market-
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based principles, an approach resembling the NPM ide-
ology ascendant around the same time in the United
Kingdom.
In 1982, the average profit margin of for-profit hos-
pital chains was more than double that of the hospital
sector as a whole, 9.2% versus 4.3%.66 While advocates
saw this as an indication of more effective manage-
ment,62 the growth of investor-owned hospital chains
provoked increasing debate, leading the Institute of
Medicine to undertake the first large-scale study of for-
profit hospitals in 1986.64 The Institute panel concluded,
ambiguously, that for-profit ownership was having an
important effect on the health system, but that the avail-
able evidence was insufficient to justify policies either
opposing or supporting investor ownership.64
The administration’s political bent precluded taking
any steps that directly challenged the existence of the
for-profit hospital sector. However, starting in 1982,
the generous capital reimbursements to for-profit pro-
viders were gradually phased out after the publication
of highly critical reports by the U.S. General Accounting
Office.67 The return-on-equity payment rate was cut
from 1.5 to 1.0 times the rate of return of the Hospital
Insurance Trust, and the option to charge Medicare for
acquisition costs was discontinued by the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984.68
In 1983, Medicare replaced cost-plus hospital reim-
bursement with a system based on diagnostic-related-
groups (DRGs).69 DRG proponents hoped the shift
would stimulate efficiency and moderate hospital costs.
Initially, the for-profit sector welcomed the new payment
approach, anticipating that it would reward more effi-
cient providers and hence be to its advantage. But things
turned out differently. Reports of high hospital profit
margins led Congress to repeatedly reduce annual pay-
ment rate increases, which cut profits.70 Capital costs
and return on equity payments were gradually folded
into DRG payments, rather than being add-ons, as
under Medicare’s prior payment system. By 1992, for-
profit hospitals were no longer receiving the extra pay-
ments they had enjoyed since 1966. Moreover, adverse
publicity generated by the practice of patient dumping of
critically ill uninsured patients71 triggered passage of the
1986 Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act,
which to this day requires emergency departments to
stabilize urgently ill patients regardless of ability
to pay,72 crimping for-profits’ ability to avoid unprofit-
able patients.
The for-profit hospital industry’s exuberant expendi-
tures on lobbying indicate the importance it has placed
on political and regulatory decision making. In 1985, the
industry accounted for 36% of all hospital lobbying
expenses and 30% of hospitals’ contributions to political
candidates, while its trade association funded another
25% of contributions.73 Despite these contributions,
for-profits encountered some new policy constraints,
but kept on growing.
The Managed Care Era. Starting in the 1980s, traditional
health insurance that paid virtually anything that any
provider charged gradually gave way to managed care
plans, which negotiated lower prices, imposed strict uti-
lization management, and restricted provider net-
works.74 The price reductions, narrow networks, and
utilization reviews reduced hospital utilization and left
hospitals with excess capacity.75 The financial pressure
on hospitals was intensified by the 1997 Balanced Budget
Act, which initiated 3 years of meager Medicare pay-
ment rate increases. For-profit hospitals’ revenues
stalled, and the acquisition value per bed was halved.76
For-profit hospital chains responded by reshaping
themselves into locally dominant systems (i.e., oligopo-
lies) with the muscle to extract higher prices from private
payers. They also initiated grassroots (or “Astroturf”)
campaigns to loosen the restraints imposed by the
Balanced Budget Act and contributed to the managed
care backlash of the late 1990s; this pushed many private
payers to shift to plans (such as preferred provider
organizations) that had less restrictive networks
(although they also typically came with higher
copayments).77
Several other strategies have bolstered the for-profit
hospital sector’s resilience in the United States, despite
less favorable reimbursement regulations and increasing
penetration of managed care. For-profits have diversi-
fied through activities such as psychiatric inpatient care
and have applied rigorous “turnaround management” to
failing public and nonprofit hospitals they have
acquired. Some firms have reaped profits by acquiring
cash-strapped hospitals sitting on valuable real estate
Table 2. Growth of Investor-Owned Hospital Chains Around 1980 in the United States.
Number of chain-
owned hospitals
Percentage of
total hospital beds
Number of stand-alone
for-profit hospitals
1975 378 5.2% 682
1980 531 7.5% NA
1982 682 8.9 % 330
Source: Gray.64
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and selling off the buildings. For-profit hospitals have
also sometimes profited by manipulating complex rules:
for example, purchasing publicly financed assets at
below-market prices. Finally, several of the largest for-
profit firms have engaged in outright fraud and abuse,
including large-scale up-coding (portraying patients as
sicker than they really are to maximize reimburse-
ment).78 HCA, still the largest for-profit chain, paid
$840 million to settle charges of engaging in such inap-
propriate practices,79 while another for-profit hospital
organization, Tenet, has paid millions in fines for over-
billing Medicare for cardiac surgery.80,81
Physician Incentives and Participation in the For-Profit Sector.
Although an increasing proportion of U.S. physicians
are employed by hospitals,82 historically, most have
been self-employed and affiliated with one or more hos-
pitals. In earlier decades, for-profit hospitals offered
physicians financial incentives, such as an equity stake
in a local venture, to admit patients.12 Starting in the
1980s, for-profit and other general hospitals faced
increasing competition for lucrative patients from out-
patient surgery centers and physician-owned specialty
hospitals offering a limited range of services, such as
orthopedic and cardiac surgery.
Specialty hospitals were particularly threatening for
the existing general for-profit hospital industry because
of their focus on high-revenue services and the rapid
growth in their patient volumes. In December 2003,
Congress imposed an 18-month moratorium banning
new physician-owned specialty hospitals from billing
Medicare. While the American Medical Association
had, until 1984, discouraged physician ties to for-profit
hospitals, in 2004 it opposed extending the moratorium –
opposition that was overridden by hospital groups that
lobbied intensively against specialty hospitals’ “unfair”
competition. In 2005, Congress re-imposed the morato-
rium83; however, it was lifted again in 2006.84
At present, wages for non-physician hospital employ-
ees are generally lower at for-profit than at nonprofit
hospitals, a reversal of the pattern in 1990.85In contrast,
for-profits often offer physicians lucrative arrangements
in the form of incentive-based payments86 or a share of
hospital profits.87
Recent Developments: The Affordable Care Act, the Trump
Administration, and the COVID-19 Crisis. The most impor-
tant effect of the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA) was
a reduction in the uninsured rate from 15.5% in 2010 to
8.6% in 2016.88 The decline of the number of uninsured
benefited the for-profit sector by reducing bad debt and
free care, although this has been offset by rising copay-
ments that have led to increases in bad debts among
persons with coverage.89 The ACA also implemented
accountable care organizations (ACOs) and so-called
value-based purchasing programs in Medicare, which
have had mixed effects on hospital margins. Moreover,
the vast majority of hospitals participating in ACOs are
nonprofits.90
In addition, the ACA cut the annual increase in
Medicare’s payment rates for hospitals, widening the
gap between the rates paid by public versus private
insurers91 and increasing the incentives to recruit pri-
vately insured patients.92 Of particular relevance to
for-profit hospitals, Section 6001 of the ACA placed
new restrictions on existing physician-owned specialty
hospitals and reinstated a moratorium on payments to
new ones. While several such hospitals rushed to open
before the moratorium came into effect, their numbers
subsequently fell, to the advantage of other for-profit
hospitals.93
On the whole, it appears that nonprofit and public
hospitals have borne the brunt of adverse financial con-
sequences from the ACA, while for-profits have contin-
ued to prosper, as illustrated by their more favorable
Medicare margins (Figure 2) and by the fact that the
profit margins of the largest for-profit chains have
remained relatively stable or increased.
Until the COVID-19 outbreak, for-profit hospitals
have fared particularly well during the Trump adminis-
tration. While the corporate tax cuts enacted in 2017
attenuated the tax exemption advantage of nonprofit
hospitals,108 they saved the largest for-profit chains an
estimated $800 million in 2018.109 And since Trump
assumed office, Medicare reimbursement rates have
increased, benefiting both nonprofit and for-profit
hospitals.110
Most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has damaged
the finances of for-profit hospitals111 because, as one
firm said in a statement, “Elective surgeries are the cor-
nerstone of our hospital system’s operating model – and
the negative impact due to the cancellation of these pro-
cedures cannot be overstated.”112 At the time of this
writing, the long-term repercussions of the pandemic
on for-profit hospitals remain uncertain.
The United Kingdom
For-Profit Hospitals in a Country With a National Health
Service. The NHS, established in 1948, promised care
“free at the point of delivery” to all. The Labour
Government nationalized almost the entire hospital
sector. Only some nonprofit hospitals remained outside
the NHS at the time, and several private insurers, antic-
ipating that demand for private insurance would persist,
formed the British United Provident Association
(BUPA), which, in 1949, covered 34,000 subscribers.12
Until the 1970s, this so-called independent sector had
modest growth. While hospitals outside the NHS origi-
nally comprised primarily nonprofits, this independent
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sector transitioned to mostly for-profit ownership over
time.
To enlist senior specialists’ (consultants’) crucial sup-
port for the NHS,113 the government allowed them to
engage in some lucrative private practice within NHS
hospitals, using so-called pay beds. Pay-bed payment
rates were very high, although the number of patients
who used them was small.114 Nevertheless, these pay
beds were very important for the income of consultants,
and the NHS’s founding father, Aneurin Bevan, famous-
ly described: “I stuffed their mouths full with gold”.115
Initially, pay-bed care was mainly financed through
out-of-pocket payments. While the role of private insur-
ance grew over time,116 by as late as 1975, 40% of bills
for private care in the NHS were still paid out-of-
pocket.117 When some nonprofit hospitals began to be
incorporated into the NHS, the availability of private
care was limited and private insurers were increasingly
anxious to expand the supply of private providers for
their clients. In 1957, BUPA, by far the largest private
insurance company, donated a substantial sum to facil-
itate the emergence of the first private nonprofit hospital
chain, known as the Nuffield Hospitals. By 1967,
Nuffield was operating 13 hospitals, which grew to 26
in 1976.118 It remains a nonprofit, but commercially
influenced private hospital chain.
Commercial Conversions in the For-Profit Sector. During the
1970s, private hospital care triggered heated debate. In
1974, the Labour Government, supported by the unions,
tried to simultaneously limit the number of NHS pay
beds and severely curtail the independent sector.119
They harvested the opposite: a much more commercial
independent hospital sector. The government’s policies
posed a direct threat to the income of NHS consultants
who pursued private practice. Many consultants were
outraged, and massive strikes loomed. A coalition of
private insurers and private hospitals managed to
gather the support of the British Medical Association
(BMA) to block implementation of these policies.120
The government compromised: The number of pay
beds would be reduced, but less than had been previous-
ly planned, and the government promised less interfer-
ence with the independent sector. However, an
unintended consequence was that NHS consultants
began to refer large numbers of their private patients
to the independent sector.
Spurred by new opportunities, the independent hos-
pital sector took on an increasingly for-profit character,
as new for-profit providers stepped into the market.
BUPA founded its own for-profit hospital subsidiary.
U.S. hospital chains opted to enter the United
Kingdom, which served as a pilot to test whether they
could find success outside their home country. These
groups invested heavily in new facilities and equipment.
The prospects of the young for-profit hospital sector
greatly improved after Margaret Thatcher’s rise to prime
minister in 1979 and the ascendancy of NPM ideology in
the NHS, which was fueled by the Griffiths report.121
Retrenchment of the public sector was at the core of
Figure 2. Trends in Medicare margins of all US hospitals (left panel) and the profit margins of the largest for-profit hospital firms (right
panel).a
aMargins in the left graph are calculated as payments minus Medicare-allowable costs, divided by payments. “Overall Medicare margin is for acute inpatient,
outpatient, hospital-based skilled nursing facility (including swing beds), hospital-based home health, and inpatient psychiatric and rehabilitation services, plus
uncompensated care, graduate medical education, and electronic health record incentive payments” (p.85)94 The margins in the right graph are calculated as
Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA).
Sources: MedPAC (2017)94, MedPAC (2019)95, Bureau van Dijk (2020)96, HCA Healthcare (2015;2013;2010)97,98,99, Universal Health Services
(2018;2015;2013;2010)100,101,102,103, Tenet Healthcare Corporation (2018; 2015;2013;2010)104,105,106,107
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this ideological project. NHS budgets were curtailed,
causing large increases in waiting lists for elective sur-
gery and making private alternatives more attractive.
The government also encouraged public purchasers to
consider the private sector in their tendering process,122
opening up additional opportunities for consultants to
earn money in the independent sector (also referred to as
revised consultant contracts). As a result, in 1984, 85%
of consultants engaged in some private practice – the
highest figure since the NHS’s founding.123 Between
1979 and 1985, the number of private-sector beds
increased from about 6,500 to 10,200, with for-profit
hospitals accounting for half of the total.124 However,
the government’s attempts to commission for-profit clin-
ics to reduce NHS waiting lists proved unsuccessful.125
One of the problems was that the marginal costs of using
private facilities were higher on average.125 These higher
costs reflected: (a) very high private physician rates
(according to Laing, up to 5 times higher than in other
countries126) and (b) scale disadvantages because many
of the private clinics were very small.12 Private providers
were able to demand high prices from private health
insurers because of limited competition in the private
sector and because patients perceived private care as a
luxury product.127
The Internal Market and the Purchaser-Provider Split. In 1991,
local health authorities were given the responsibility of
commissioning hospital care (under the so-called pur-
chaser-provider split) and were allowed to purchase serv-
ices from private for-profits under certain circumstances.
Many NHS trusts reformed their pay beds into Private
Patient Units in separate complexes that mimicked the
more luxurious surroundings of the private sector. The
private sector perceived this development as a threat to
its business and argued that it constituted unfair compe-
tition.128 While the purchaser-provider split did not sub-
stantially change the NHS provider markets – with
public providers continuing to enjoy local monopolies
and encounter little competition – the outdated capital
(i.e., buildings and equipment) infrastructure of the
NHS and increasing waiting lists nourished the continu-
ing growth of the for-profit hospital industry.
In the late 1990s, Tony Blair’s New Labour
Government initiated massive investments in the NHS.
Consultants were offered substantial pay raises if they
agreed to work more NHS-hours.129 By 2012, the pro-
portion of consultants engaged in private practice had
fallen to 53%, down from approximately 70% in
1993.130–132 NHS consultants were also discouraged
from relying on private earnings by the imposition of
the “10% rule,” which forbade those on full-time con-
tracts from earning more than 10% of their income from
private practice.131 Gradually, the NHS became more
appealing to private patients.
These changes also led the for-profit sector to gain
interest in selling services to the NHS. In 2002, for-
profit independent treatment centers took part in a
£1.6 billion program to reduce NHS waiting lists133
and in 2005, a second phase was launched with an esti-
mated cost of £4 billion.134 Most contracts were given to
new foreign providers, which set up special clinics for
this purpose. These non-British physicians were typically
cheaper to employ and ensured compliance with a pro-
hibition on drawing away NHS staff.135 Established pri-
vate providers observed this new competition with
dismay.
The prospects of the new patient-choice policies were
also problematic. Under these policies, patients could
opt for any private provider willing to accept the
NHS’s payment rates. Consequently, private hospital
groups increasingly felt pressured to either stay with
their existing high-cost business model catering to pri-
vate patients or to adopt new, low-cost business models
for NHS patients. Private insurers also became more
critical purchasers, trying to lower costs by stimulating
the growth of hospital networks. However, this shift
actually favored for-profit groups because of their
larger scale and negotiation power. By 2007, the for-
profit sector operated almost 75% of all private hospital
beds, but overall growth had stalled.12
The Decade of Austerity. The 2008 financial crisis led to
austerity policies that had a negative impact on private
care, as illustrated by the negative profit margins of BMI
Healthcare, the largest private provider (Table 3). Spire
and Ramsay – a global firm that today operates 480
hospitals worldwide, including in the United Kingdom
– fared better over the long term (Table 3). These woes
were largely attributable to the decline of private insur-
ance, with enrollment falling steeply in the past decade.51
Private hospitals were only partly able to compensate for
this decline by increasing services covered by low-margin
public funding and a small number of self-pay patients.
The Conservative government’s stringent austerity
policies held health care expenditures flat over a 4-year
period (2011–2012 to 2014–2015) while the government
opened opportunities for private providers to deliver
services paid for by the NHS. The white paper Equity
and Excellence: Liberating the NHS mandated that
patients be allowed to seek care from any provider of
their choosing and that quality guidelines and prices be
harmonized.142 The Health and Social Act (2012) intro-
duced Commissioning Groups – one of the most far-
reaching pieces of legislation in the history of the
NHS.143 Private providers were finally granted the
right to bid for contracts to deliver NHS services and
won one-third of all contracts (although 85% of the
funds were still awarded to NHS providers).144 With
this increased access to NHS contracts, the private
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sector now derives 32% of its revenues from lower-
margin public funding, up from 5% a decade ago.51
Austerity measures also affected NHS consultants.
Because of a pay freeze put in place in 2010 that applied
to all NHS staff, total gross earnings fell by 2.6%
between 2009 and 2015, and junior doctors and consul-
tants alike had to tighten their belts.145 Moreover, the
private sector’s financial problems curtailed consultants’
opportunities to supplement their incomes.
Brexit and the Future of For-Profit Hospitals in the United
Kingdom. Although for-profit providers can now com-
pete for NHS resources, popular suspicion about a
post-Brexit “privatization of the NHS” persists. In addi-
tion, the BMA has become more critical of the private
sector and highlights the risks associated with contract-
ing private hospitals to deliver NHS care.146 They and
others have voiced concern about the lack of transpar-
ency of private hospitals.146,147
The question at present is what impact the Long-
Term Plan for the NHS and the COVID-19 crisis will
have on the private sector. The Long-Term Plan dele-
gates greater autonomy to the United Kingdom’s new
leading integrated care systems – its version of ACOs148
– to manage services. These systems may enjoy even
greater latitude to contract out services to private part-
ners. At the time of this writing, the COVID-19 out-
break hit the United Kingdom (especially England)
hard in terms of excess mortality compared with other
continental European countries.149 The huge backlog in
maintenance of NHS buildings – estimated to total £6.5
billion150 – and the strain on the public budget caused by
the medical catastrophe and impending recession may
push the government to seek further support from the
private sector. During the COVID-19 outbreak in spring
2020, the government has block-bought the private hos-
pital capacity.111
Germany: Privatization of the Public Sector
In the early 20th century, affluent families usually
received inpatient and outpatient hospital care at propri-
etary clinics. From 1931 onward, hospitals were required
to focus only on inpatient treatment, and most of their
physicians were salaried.151 However, in rural areas, due
to shortages of local ambulatory specialist care, some
proprietary staff hospitals continued to function as
“open staff” facilities in which a combination of outpa-
tient and inpatient care were still permitted.12
Short on Money After World War II. World War II destroyed
the German hospital sector. West Germany became a
federal republic, with powers vested in the states if not
explicitly granted to the federal government. In health
care, many powers were delegated to nongovernmental
bodies, with self-regulation (including the allowance of
mixed hospital ownership) serving as a guiding principle.
Thus, although for-profit providers and their participa-
tion in health care delivery were legally uncontroversial,
the for-profit hospital sector’s market share declined
until German reunification in 1989.12
After World War II, the hospital sector was in a dire
state and had to be completely rebuilt. However, capital
was scarce, and public needs other than hospitals were
prioritized. Hospitals incurred significant deficits annu-
ally,152 which, in many cases, had to be covered by the
states and the municipalities that owned them. The fede-
ral government and sickness funds that paid the hospi-
tals focused on keeping contribution rates low. As a
result, policies during the 1950s and 1960s largely prior-
itized public and nonprofit hospitals over for-profit
hospitals.152For-profits could therefore not fall back on
deficit funding from local governments, capital subsidies
from the states, or endowments and free labor from the
voluntary sector. Two niche markets survived: (a) one
that offered profitable services and better amenities to
well-off, privately insured patients whose insurers paid
rates 1.5 to 2 times as high as those paid by sickness
funds153 and (b) one that provided access to inpatient
facilities for ambulatory medical specialists in sparsely
populated rural areas, especially Bavaria.154
Nevertheless, by 1969 the proprietary hospitals’ share
of acute care beds had fallen to 4.3%, down from
almost 8% in the late 1950s.12
Table 3. Profit Margins of the Largest U.K. Hospital Chains.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
BMI Healthcarea 3.5% 6.3% 8.5% 2.4% 1.7% 0.0% 10.0% 4.2% 1.9%
Ramsayb 9.0% 9.7% 10.4% 10.4% 6.0%
Spire Healthcarec 6.8% 0.8% 8.3% 7.9% 2.4% 0.9%
Sources: Bureau van Dijk,96 Ramsay,136–138 and Spire healthcare.139–141
aBMI Healthcare figures are based on Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT).
bFigures are based on EBITDA of Ramsay’s hospitals in the United Kingdom.
cFigures are based on EBITDA.
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Dual Funding: Capital Versus Current Costs. The pressing
financial situation of the hospital sector was finally
addressed in 1972. The Hospital Finance Act (HFA)
(which required a change in the constitution) initiated
systematic planning of hospital infrastructure, with the
federal government assuming responsibility to co-fund
hospital investments. The HFA introduced dual fund-
ing, whereby the states (L€ander) and federal government
were jointly responsible for funding capital investments.
The amounts invested were based on state planning and
calculations of operating costs by sickness funds.
While the HFA greatly augmented hospital funding,
it prevented for-profit hospitals from receiving capital
subsidies for about the first 10 years of its existence.
These entities were excluded from hospital planning.
Moreover, private physicians in for-profits were not per-
mitted to charge sickness funds higher rates for their
services than other providers. Sickness funds could
only contract with for-profit hospitals under limited con-
ditions and were not required to contract with physicians
who were not listed in state hospital plans.155,156 Thus,
for-profit hospitals either had to operate with a lower
cost base than their peers or had to rely on private
patients.
Most states were unable to meet demands for public
capital and soon shortages became evident, the so-called
Investitionsstau. Additionally, in 1984 – a year after a
right-leaning party came into power – the federal gov-
ernment stopped contributing to hospital capital invest-
ment and reduced hospital investment budgets.157 At
this point, rules were changed to permit states to incor-
porate for-profit providers in their hospital plans.158
Additionally, hospital operating payment plans increas-
ingly included funding for small investments. Many
municipalities struggling to support heavily indebted
public hospitals debated privatizing them; in 1984, the
city of Hürth, unwilling to continue meeting its hospi-
tal’s annual deficit, was the first to turn to
privatization.159
Reunification and the Boom in For-Profit Hospital Care. In
1989, German reunification triggered a for-profit hospi-
tal boom. Reunified Germany had to cope with large
numbers of neglected public hospitals in the eastern
part of the country and privatization seemed an appeal-
ing solution. For-profit hospitals were according prom-
inent roles in most of the new states.157 Corporate tax
reductions also improved the investment climate.47
In 1989, Rh€on-Klinikum was the first hospital group
to be listed on the public stock exchange. Other hospital
chains soon emerged, including Fresenius/Helios and
Asklepios. Such publicly traded hospital groups were
well-positioned to take over and consolidate struggling
hospitals in Eastern Germany. They paid very low (or
no) acquisition costs, while taxpayers were providing
relatively generous capital funding (Figure 3). By 2001,
the privatization of hospitals to for-profit status was 22%
in Thuringia, 20% in Saxony, 16% in Mecklenburg, 12%
in Berlin, and 11% in Brandenburg, with only Saxony-
Anhalt lagging somewhat behind.12
The financial situation of the hospitals in West
Germany stagnated, partly because huge state invest-
ments were being made to improve living standards in
East Germany (e.g., infrastructure investments).161 This
eventually triggered privatization in the West as well.
For-profit hospital market share in Hesse and
Schleswig-Holstein grew to over 20%. However, in
densely populated North Rhine-Westphalia, which had
many private nonprofit hospitals, for-profit market
share remained under 5% in 2007.12
Physicians were generally amenable to for-profit hos-
pital conversions, in part because they typically offered
more favorable terms of employment.162 (However,
since 2008, physicians in public hospitals have received
larger salary increases).163Public-sector wages today are
uniform across hospitals,164 while labor agreements set
private-sector wage scales that vary from hospital to
hospital.165 At present, physician pay is generally lower
in for-profit hospitals (Table 4), although Helios is an
exception.166 The income of physician executives in for-
profit hospitals, however, is often tied to the financial
performance of the hospital and in some cases may be
significantly higher than the amounts called for in the
labor agreements.167
Hospital payment reforms introduced in the 1992
Health Care Structure Act and the 1997 Hospital
Restructuring Act gradually weakened the dual funding
structure and paved the way toward a DRG-like pro-
spective payment system. Although the principle of the
dual funding structure remained intact, these acts intro-
duced fixed budgets and spending caps to curb costs. In
other words, these reforms put the hospital sector under
Figure 3. Total annual hospital capital funding
(Krankenhausfinanzierungsgesetz) 1970–2020.
Source: Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Obersten Landesgesundheitsbeh€orden.160
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financial pressure. Whereas between 1988 and 1992, state
subsidies covered almost all capital investments, between
1993 and 1997 this fell, with almost 40% of hospital
capital investments coming from sources other than
state subsidies.172 As for-profit hospitals received lower
levels of state capital subsidies than public hospitals,
they were less affected and, therefore, gained a certain
comparative advantage.157,173,174
Merkel’s Legacy on For-Profit Hospital Growth in Germany.
Angela Merkel’s chancellorship has produced no major
reforms in the health care sector,175 but incremental
policy changes during her tenure may have had pro-
found long-term effects. First, the 2015 Health Care
Strengthening Act, which aimed to foster integration
among providers and to integrate care models, weakened
the separation between inpatient and outpatient care and
allowed hospitals to provide some ambulatory
care.176,177 This legislative change opened up a new
market for the for-profit sector. Second, the 2016
Hospital Structure Reform Act called for quality-based
hospital planning and pay-for-performance plans and
aspired to reduce capacity, consolidate care into fewer
facilities, and control inpatient utilization. As a result,
the Fixkostendegressionsabschlag (FDA) now fines hos-
pitals that increase the volume of care they deliver. Some
predict that this legislation may incentivize hospitals to
provide more lucrative services and avoid provision of
less profitable ones.178
The hospital sector has prospered under Merkel’s
regime, with the profit margins of all hospitals rising
by approximately 1 to 3 percentage points (authors’
own calculations).178–180 Yet, the profit margin of the
for-profit sector as a whole remains significantly higher
than that of the other ownership types.178–180 Profit mar-
gins of the largest for-profit hospitals chains depict a
similar pattern, with relatively stable profit margins
over the years (Table 5).
At present, Germany has a large and prosperous for-
profit hospital sector, and the financial environment
remains favorable for for-profit hospitals. However,
the competition authority has recently raised concerns
about the high level of concentration in the private hos-
pital market,181 making it more difficult for for-profit
chains to continue to expand domestically. Partly for
this reason, Fresenius – the largest German hospital
firm, operating under the hospital brand name Helios
– took over Quironsalud to expand in Spain and thus
become the largest hospital chain in Europe.
The Netherlands: A Counterfactual Case to For-Profit
Hospital Growth
Why the For-Profit Hospital Industry Did Not Kick Off in the
Netherlands. Dutch for-profit hospitals have never flour-
ished. Nonprofit hospitals have had a strong foothold in
the health care system since the 1850s because of the
reliance in Dutch society on religious communities
(rather than government) to provide social services –
so-called pillarization. For a long time, nonprofit hospi-
tals were also open staff, which discouraged physicians
from building their own, competing facilities. Thus, the
drivers of proprietary hospitals in the United States, the
United Kingdom and Germany (lack of physician access
and lack of amenities and services for the well-off) were
Table 4. Monthly Gross Pay Scales (in Euros) for Medical Specialists According to Number of Years of Service, 2019.
1–3 years 4–6 years 7–8 years 9–10 years 11–12 years 13 years
Public hospitals 5,956 6,455 6,894 7,149 7,399 7,649
Rh€on Klinikum 5,579 6,040 6,514 6,745 7,031 7,188
Asklepios 6,025 6,530 6,965 7,230 7,475 7,625
Heliosa 6,123–6,305 6,634–6,938 7,182–7,486 7,546–7,608 7,729–7,791 7,791
Sources: Vereinigung der kommunalen Arbeitgeberverb€ande, Helios, Asklepios, Rh€on Klinikum.168–171
aHelios is the only one with where pay scales rise with each year of experience rather than every 2 to 3 years, hence the range in the cells.
Table 5. Profit Margins Largest Chains in Germany.a
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Asklepios Kliniken 5.7% 5.3% 6.2% 5.3% 6.7% 6.6% 7.7% 8.6%
Helios Kliniken (Krefeld, Schwerin,
Duisburg, Hildesheim, München)
5.8% 3.6% 4.0% 3.5% 6.6% 8.4% 11.1% 9.6% 11.6%
Sana Kliniken AG 3.7% 3.7% 3.1% 3.2% 3.7% 4.0% 4.9% 4.7%
Source: Bureau van Dijk.96
aFigures are based on EBIT. Helios is the biggest German chain, but figures only reflect the profit margins of the 5 mentioned hospitals between brackets.
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not prominent in the Netherlands, and nonprofit hospi-
tals gradually became the dominant providers.
After World War II, hospitals wanting to make new
capital investments were required to obtain a certificate
of need from the local municipality, but the local gov-
ernment bore no responsibility for funding the invest-
ment. Instead, the social insurance plan was required
to include reimbursement for approved capital expendi-
tures (but not return on equity) in each hospital’s per-
diem rates, making hospital capital investments virtually
risk-free and obviating the need for hospitals to accumu-
late cash for down payments.12 As a result, a construc-
tion boom followed, but with little demand for private
capital to fund hospital investments182 and little profit
incentive for investors,183 conditions were not favorable
for the growth of for-profit hospitals.
Legal Prohibition of For-Profit Hospital Ownership. The 1971
Hospital Facilities Act (HFA) was a response to the
burst of construction and fears that costs would escalate.
The act centralized hospital planning (by removing
municipalities’ right to approve new hospital invest-
ments) and provided a mechanism to enforce cost-
containment policies. The HFA also prohibited
for-profit hospitals from receiving certificates of need
or reimbursements from the social insurance plan.184
This legal restriction was the final door to close on the
prospects of for-profits (although theoretically, it
remained possible for for-profits to purchase existing
nonprofit hospitals and offer services to privately
insured patients). Private insurers, which covered the
wealthiest 30% of the market, were strongly embedded
in the corporatist decision-making structures of Dutch
health care and, unlike in the United Kingdom and
Germany, did not push for the development of private
hospitals.
Managed Competition, But Without For-Profit Hospitals.
Managed competition theory profoundly influenced
Dutch health policy. The 2006 Health Insurance Act
was the flagship effort to create an entirely private
health care system, based on the principles of regulated
competition, with hospitals paid through DRGs.
Under the reform, private insurers could compete for
customers – although they were prohibited from distrib-
uting profits to owners or shareholders – and were given
increasing latitude to negotiate prices with providers; in
2012, prices for 70% of inpatient DRGs were subject to
negotiation.185 With managed competition being the
new policy paradigm, for-profit hospital ownership was
seen by many, including the High Court,184 as the logical
next step.186 Moreover, the 2005 Health Care
Institutions Admission Act, the successor to the HFA,
had simplified regulations and reduced the government’s
role in hospital planning, which seemingly opened the
way to lift the ban on for-profit hospitals. Indeed, the
government stated that it was prepared to lift the ban by
2012 and that hospitals would be permitted to become
private companies as long as they did not pay any div-
idends to investors until the ban was formally lifted.184
Twelve hospitals converted to private ownership status,
although not all sought to become for-profits (authors’
calculations using annual reports). In 2008, the remain-
ing certificate of need regulations and capital reimburse-
ment plans were phased out. Hospitals were then free to
(re)develop property. However, under prospective pay-
ments, they became exposed to investment risks.187
In anticipation of the lifting of the ban on hospitals
operating in a for-profit mode, private investors
acquired 3 hospitals: MC (medical center) Slotervaart,
MC Ijsselmeerziekenhuizen, and Red Cross Hospital. In
the case of the Ijsselmeerziekenhuizen, the government
donated approximately e20 million to save it (2008).188
The 2 MC hospitals eventually ran into severe financial
problems and by late 2018 were bankrupt; MC
Slotervaart had to close its doors permanently in 2019,
and the other hospital was merged with a local non-
profit.189 An independent committee investigating the
causes of the bankruptcy cited, among other factors,
the medical staff’s suspicion that shareholders extracted
money from the hospital through rent paid to an affili-
ated real estate firm. These suspicions fueled a toxic rela-
tionship between the medical staff and the shareholders/
board of directors and made it difficult to reorganize the
hospital.190 The Red Cross hospital remains in a stron-
ger financial position191 and is currently the only surviv-
ing investor-owned hospital.
Is There a Future for For-Profit Hospitals in the Netherlands?.
The government’s promise to lift the ban on for-profit
hospitals’ distribution of dividends was always contro-
versial, and left-leaning parties that opposed lifting the
ban were sometimes supported by the Christian
Democrats. In 2013, the House of Representatives
approved a law that was favorable toward for-profit
hospitals, but that still imposed several restrictions: for
example, no profits could be distributed for the first 3
years, hospitals would have to maintain solvency ratios
of at least 20%, and the hospital would have to receive a
positive rating from the Health Care Inspectorate.192
However, in 2014, the Dutch Minister of Health, Edith
Schippers, asked the Senate to delay voting on the
law,193 claiming it was not ready for implementation.
Political considerations apparently contributed to the
postponement; it has since come to light that the
Senate would probably have voted against the law.194
In 2017, the newly formed government promised to
make a decision in 2018 on whether to proceed with the
law, but subsequently again postponed this to 2019.195 In
October 2019, the Minister of Health encountered
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political obstacles because of the widely publicized
defaults of the commercially owned hospitals, described
above, and scandals regarding excessive profits in the
home care sector.196 This was the straw that broke the
camel’s back; the government announced that it was
taking the repeal of the ban on for-profit hospitals off
the table.197
For the foreseeable future, the Dutch hospital sector will
remain exclusively private, not-for-profit. However, it is
notable that the nonprofit hospitals have greatly improved
their capitalization. Solvency ratios (assets/liabilities),
which in 2002 were estimated to be 7%,198 now average
nearly 25% – an increase that has occurred mostly since
the 2006market reforms (Table 6). Because owners/manag-
ers of other types of health care providers have developed
creative accounting tricks to circumvent the ban on distrib-
uting profits,199 such high levels of solvencymight well draw
the attention of investors in the future.
Discussion
Why the For-Profit Hospital Sector Has Thrived in
Some Countries, but Not Others
After a period of decline during the first part of the 20th
century, the for-profit hospital sector has grown rapidly
in some, but not all, developed nations in recent decades.
For-profit hospital market share rose steeply in
Germany after reunification and somewhat less briskly
in the United States since the 1960s. However, growth
has been slow in the United Kingdom and almost nil in
the Netherlands.
In the United States, public Medicare and Medicaid
insurance programs implemented in the mid-1960s were
favorable toward for-profit hospitals, offering them
higher payments than nonprofits. Conversely, the
United Kingdom’s NHS sidelined for-profits in 1948,
and both the Netherlands (1971) and Germany (1972)
excluded for-profit hospitals from most sources of public
funding. With the rise of neoliberalism and NPM in
recent years, all 4 countries have moved to bolster the
role of for-profits, albeit with varying effects.
What explains for-profits’ divergent paths across
these 4 countries? Neither our case studies nor previous
research suggest that for-profit success is attributable to
greater efficiency. Instead, our cross-national
comparisons suggest that 3 other factors influence the
likelihood of for-profit success (Table 7): (a) access to
capital funding and reimbursement for services from
government health care financing programs, together
with the generosity of these reimbursements; (b) the
extent to which physicians’ financial interests coincide
with for-profit interests; and (c) the political environ-
ment. The first of these factors, the specific, seemingly
arcane details of the terms of for-profits’ participation in
public health care financing programs – especially access
to capital funding – appears most important. Physicians’
ability to realize financial benefit from for-profit hospi-
tals was relevant in the early 20th century, but its impor-
tance has since waned. The political environment shapes
key health care financing policies, but explicit decisions
to ban or encourage for-profit ownership are often
short-lived and of lesser importance.
Public Payment Systems’ Effects on For-Profit
Development
Three aspects of public policies regarding provider pay-
ments appear important: (a) regulations that determine
access to capital subsidies and return on investments, (b)
whether for-profits are allowed to bill public programs
for the care they deliver, and (c) the effects of system-
wide cost-control policies.
After World War II, private funds for hospital invest-
ment were scarce in all 4 of the countries we analyzed.
Governments stepped in to provide resources to expand
hospital capacity through programs that largely or
completely excluded for-profits. Unable to access sub-
stantial funding to build or modernize facilities, for-
profit providers mainly focused on niche markets.
Except for the Netherlands and Germany, for-profits
gained greater access to public funding in the 1960s and
1970s. From its inception in 1965 until about 1990, the
U.S. Medicare program gave for-profits an explicit com-
petitive advantage in the form of more generous capital
payments than were available to nonprofit or public hos-
pitals. Thereafter, the playing field was formally leveled.
German for-profits gained formal (but only partial)
access to the stream of public health care funds starting
in the 1970s and 1980s. However, for-profits’ privileged
access to private capital funding through stock sales
offered a decisive advantage in the early 1990s and
Table 6. Solvency Rates for Dutch Hospitals (2007–2017).a
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Average solvency rates 11.9% 12.7% 14.1% 14.8% 16.8% 18.9% 20.8% 22.4% 20.9% 21.6% 23.7%
Median solvency rates 12.1% 12.6% 12.4% 13.8% 18.1% 19.6% 20.5% 22.5% 21.2% 22.4% 24.4%
Source: CIBG.54
aAuthors’ calculations.
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allowed them to take over many East German hospitals
badly in need of funds for modernization. In the United
Kingdom, the NHS has, since its founding, had a serious
shortage of capital funds. Inadequate funding of the
public sector created an opening for private providers
to attract modest funding from investors. In contrast,
the Netherlands banned hospitals from distributing
profits to investors, effectively foreclosing the develop-
ment of for-profit hospitals.
For-profit hospitals in the United States and
Germany were granted immediate (United States) or
delayed (Germany) access to reimbursement for service
delivery from public programs. Conversely, for a long
time, the for-profit sector in the United Kingdom relied
primarily on private payments, and the sector’s mode of
provision – characterized by small-scale clinics offering
superior amenities – was shaped by their role, which was
limited mostly to providing supplementary services. The
recent advent of outsourcing by the NHS has given for-
profits access to public payments, although they have
struggled to find a profitable business model. The outlier
is, again, the Netherlands, where for-profit hospitals
were, until 2006 reforms, not allowed to bill the social
insurance plan. At present, for-profits may be reim-
bursed for services, but may not distribute profits to
investors.
Several factors contributed to the apparent resilience
of for-profit hospitals during periods when cost-
containment policies squeeze the hospital sector. For-
profits’ ability to tap into private capital when public
funding is in short supply may allow them to weather
periods of austerity. Additionally, for-profits appear
more willing and able to focus on profitable segments
of the hospital market (e.g., cardiac and orthopedic sur-
gery in the United States) and avoid unprofitable ones
(e.g., care of the uninsured). For-profits are also often
particularly skilled at exploiting legal (and occasionally
illegal) loopholes in payment policies (e.g., through
upcoding). Finally, the enforcement of cost controls
may open opportunities for investors to acquire strug-
gling public and nonprofit hospitals at reduced prices,
although in the United Kingdom, for-profits’ increasing
reliance on NHS funding has left them vulnerable to cuts
in public funding.
Physicians’ Financial Interests and Their Alignment
With the For-Profit Hospital Sector
Across all 4 countries, physicians’ financial interests were
influential in determining the early development of for-
profit hospitals. The United Kingdom – where consul-
tants sought a venue for private practice – was the clear-
est case. Similarly to the United Kingdom, U.S. for-
profit business models depended on attracting (the
patients of) self-employed physicians, which led some
hospital firms to offer physicians stock or equity
arrangements. In Germany, physicians in for-profit
(and other) hospitals were generally salaried employees.
To this day, nonprofit hospitals in the Netherlands are
effectively physician cooperatives that pay specialists – a
well-organized group with substantial bargaining power
– generous salaries.11
In the United Kingdom and Germany, the financial
benefits that for-profit hospitals accorded to physicians
have somewhat diminished. The number of NHS con-
sultants working in the independent sector in the United
Kingdom has declined. In Germany, the wages of physi-
cians in most for-profit hospitals are now lower than
those in other hospitals, perhaps reflecting the consoli-
dation of hospital ownership (and hence bargaining
power) as a few large chains have come to dominate
the market.200 In the United States, the number of
physician-owned hospitals appears to be declining, and
more physicians have become employees of either
Table 7. Assessment of the Impact of Factors That Affect For-Profit Hospitals’ Growth.a
United States United Kingdom Germany The Netherlands
Public funding Access to funding/reimbursement
for capital investments
4 3 4 5
Stimulated growth Stimulated growth Stimulated growth Prohibited for-profits
Access to and terms of
reimbursement for service
delivery from public programs
4 4 4 4
Stimulated growth Shaped provision Stimulated growth Hindered growth
Cost-control measures applied
to broader hospital sector
4 5 4 3
Created acquisition
targets
Mixed effects Created acquisition
targets
Created acquisition
targets
Concordance with
physicians’ financial
interests
Higher remuneration by
for-profit hospitals
4 5 3 1
Mixed effects Mixed effects Mixed effects Not applicable
Political environment Supporting for-profit growth 3 3 5 4
Little debated Mixed effects Privatizations
encouraged
Vetoed at several points
a1: very unimportant, 2: unimportant, 3: neutral, 4: important, 5: very important.
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hospitals or practices owned by venture capital or pri-
vate equity firms.201 Based on our findings, we tentative-
ly conclude that physicians’ roles in stimulating the
expansion of the for-profit hospital sector has dimin-
ished in recent years.
Political Decisions and Their (Non-)Influence on
For-Profit Market Growth
While political decisions can disrupt and influence the
for-profit hospital landscape – particularly through
reforms in hospital payment policy – the political color
of the ruling party has had surprisingly little impact on
the growth of the for-profit sector in the 4 countries we
studied (Figure 1). The only explicit effort by left-leaning
politicians to roll back for-profit hospital care, during
the mid-1970s in the United Kingdom, failed miserably
because of strong physician resistance. Instead, these
efforts backfired and induced the commercial transfor-
mation of the independent sector. In the United States,
the advent of Medicare and Medicaid, implemented by a
Democratic president as part of a broad expansion of
social programs, offered vast public subsidies to for-
profit hospitals, accelerating their growth.
On the other hand, policies inspired by neoliberalism
and NPM have had mixed effects on for-profit hospitals.
In the United States, the turn to market-based policies
starting with DRGs in the 1980s has not proven unique-
ly favorable to for-profits, in part because nonprofit hos-
pitals have increasingly mimicked for-profit strategies.
The fall of communism in Germany spurred the privat-
ization of public hospitals in the East, which continued
for more than 20 years. In the United Kingdom, the
private sector benefited from the NPM ideological shift
during Thatcher’s reign. However, despite the neoliberal
and NPM-inspired 2006 reform in the Netherlands, for-
profit hospitals there have not advanced significantly.
Several factors may underlie the limited effects of
political swings on for-profit hospital growth. The hos-
pital sector is inherently rigid: Hospitals cannot be built
nor acquire a patient base overnight. Once for-profits
have gained substantial market share, their financial
power confers political influence that enables them to
safeguard their influence. And, relatedly, hospitals, as
major employers, often wield strong influence in their
local communities, helping hospitals ward off measures
that might disrupt their business.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Our analysis highlights several factors that influence the
size and success of the for-profit hospital sector. The
seemingly technical details of how public reimbursement
plans treat for-profit providers, particularly regulations
related to accessing public capital funding and
reimbursement for private capital expenditures, have
the greatest impact. Cost-containment measures and
payment arrangements, which have squeezed some non-
profit and public hospitals in Germany and the United
States, have also stimulated for-profit growth by provid-
ing openings for investors to acquire facilities at low
costs. For-profit hospitals’ early growth in the United
States and in Germany was also abetted by physicians
who stood to gain financially. However, the role of
physicians in stimulating the expansion of the for-
profit hospital sector has apparently waned in recent
years, as more power has been ceded to investors. The
commercialization of hospital care can be a heated polit-
ical topic, with left- and right-leaning politicians often
holding opposing views. However, the political environ-
ment, at least within the spectrum present in the nations
we examined, had relatively little direct impact on the
growth of the for-profit hospital industry, with the nota-
ble exceptions of the United Kingdom in the mid-1970s
and Germany in the early 1990s.
Policy Implications
Decisions regarding public reimbursement plans are crit-
ical determinants of the growth of the for-profit hospital
sector. Such decisions influence short-term profitability
and are often relatively stable and long-lasting. Hence,
policy makers seeking to influence the composition of
the hospital market should focus on the design of pay-
ment plans, particularly the details of capital funding
and reimbursement. Intervening to reduce the capital
costs for one ownership form relative to others may
induce long-run changes in the composition of the hos-
pital sector. Thus, our findings call for closer examina-
tion of how capital reimbursement plans “steer” the
business of health. Finally, the for-profit hospital
sector is quite sticky: Once it has grown, it tends not
to shrink. This characteristic is particularly relevant in
an era when many hospitals are under financial pressure.
Privatizing financially distressed public or nonprofit hos-
pitals is relatively “easy,” but reversing privatization is
often strenuous and costly.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iD
Florien M. Kruse https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3850-9331
16 International Journal of Health Services 0(0)
References
1. Boycko M, Shleifer A, Vishny RW. A theory of privati-
sation. Econ J. 1996;106(435):309–319.
2. Megginson WL, Nash RC, Vanrandenborgh M. The
financial and operating performance of newly privatized
firms – an international empirical-analysis. J Financ.
1994;49(2):403–452.
3. Kikeri S, Nellis J, Shirley M. Privatization: The Lessons of
Experience. Washington, DC: The World Bank; 1992.
4. Saltman RB. Melting public-private boundaries in
European health systems. Eur J Public Health.
2003;13(1):24–29.
5. Hansmann HB. The role of nonprofit enterprise. Yale
Law J. 1980;89(5):835–901.
6. Furubotn EG, Pejovich S. Property rights and economic
theory – survey of recent literature. J Econ Lit.
1972;10(4):1137–1162.
7. Burns LR, Goldsmith JC, Sen A. Horizontal and vertical
integration of physicians: a tale of two tails. In: Annual
Review of Health Care Management: Revisiting the
Evolution of Health Systems Organization. Bingley, UK:
Emerald Group Publishing Limited; 2014:39–117.
8. Farley D, Hogan C. Case-mix specialisation in the market
for hospital services. Health Serv Res.
1990;25(5):757–783.
9. Kruse FM, Stadhouders NW, Adang EM, Groenewoud
S, Jeurissen PP. Do private hospitals outperform public
hospitals regarding efficiency, accessibility, and quality of
care in the European Union? A literature review. Int J
Health Plann Manage. 2018;33(2):e434–e453.
10. Arrow KJ. Uncertainty and the welfare economics of
medical care. Am Econ Rev. 1963;53(5):941–973.
11. Pauly M, Redisch M. The not-for-profit hospital as a
physicians’ cooperative. Am Econ Rev. 1973;63(1):87–99.
12. Jeurissen PPT. For Profit-Hospitals. A Comparative and
Longitudinal Study of the For-Profit Hospital Sector in
Four Western Countries. Rotterdam, the Netherlands:
Erasmus University Rotterdam; 2010.
13. Eurofound. Delivering Hospital Services: A Greater Role
for the Private Sector? Luxembourg: Publications Office
of the European Union; 2017.
14. Sengupta A, Mukhopadhyaya I, Weerasinghe MC, Karki
A. The rise of private medicine in South Asia. BMJ.
2017;357:j1482.
15. Collyer F, Harley K, Short S. Money and markets in
Australia’s healthcare system. In: Meagher G, Goodwin
S, eds. Markets, Rights and Power in Australian Social
Policy. Sydney, Australia: Sydney University Press; 2015.
16. Enthoven AC. Health Plan: The Only Practical Solution
to the Soaring Cost of Medical Care. Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley; 1980.
17. Sloan FA. Not-for-profit ownership. In: Culyer AJ,
Newhouse JP, eds. Handbook of Health Economics.
Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Elsevier; 2000.
18. Harris JE. The internal organization of hospitals: some
economic implications. Bell J Econ. 1977;8(2):467–482.
19. Sloan FA, Picone GA, Taylor DH Jr, Chou S-Y. Hospital
ownership and cost and quality of care: is there a dime’s
worth of difference? J Health Econ. 2001;20(1):1–21.
20. Eggleston K, Shen YC, Lau J, Schmid CH, Chan J.
Hospital ownership and quality of care: what explains
the different results in the literature? Health Econ.
2008;17(12):1345–1362.
21. Rosenau PV, Linder SH. Two decades of research com-
paring for-profit and nonprofit health provider perfor-
mance in the United States. Soc Sci Quart.
2003;84(2):219–241.
22. Devereaux PJ, Choi PT, Lacchetti C, et al. A systematic
review and meta-analysis of studies comparing mortality
rates of private for-profit and private not-for-profit hos-
pitals. CMAJ. 2002;166(11):1399–1406.
23. Schlesinger M, Gray BH. How nonprofits matter in
American medicine, and what to do about it. Health Aff
(Millwood). 2006;25(4): W287–W303.
24. Devereaux PJ, Heels-Ansdell D, Lacchetti C, et al.
Payments for care at private for-profit and private not-
for-profit hospitals: a systematic review and meta-analy-
sis. CMAJ. 2004;170(12):1817–1824.
25. Bai G, Anderson GF. A more detailed understanding of
factors associated with hospital profitability. Health Aff
(Millwood). 2016;35(5):889–897.
26. Ramamonjiarivelo Z, Weech-Maldonado R, Hearld L,
Pradhan R, Davlyatov GK. The privatization of public
hospitals: its impact on financial performance. Med Care
Res Rev. 2020;77(3):249–260.
27. Carter RB, Massa LJ, Power ML. An examination of the
efficiency of proprietary hospital versus nonprofit hospi-
tal ownership structures. J Account Public Policy.
1997;16:63–87.
28. Roomkin MJ, Weisbrod BA. Managerial compensation
and incentives in for-profit and nonprofit hospital. J Law
Econ Organ. 1999;15:750–781.
29. W€orz M. Erl€ose – Kosten – Qualit€at: Macht die
Krankenhaustr€agerschaft einen Unterschied? Eine verglei-
chende Untersuchung von Tr€agerunterschieden im akutstat-
tion€aren Sektor in Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten
von Amerika [Revenues, Costs, and Quality: Does Ownership
Makes a Difference? A Comparative Study Towards
Ownership Differences in General-Acute-Care in Germany
and the USA]. Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag; 2008.
30. Himmelstein DU, Jun M, Busse R, et al. A comparison of
hospital administrative costs in eight nations: US costs
exceed all others by far. Health Aff (Millwood).
2014;33(9):1586–1594.
31. Heimeshoff M, Schrey€ogg J, Tiemann O. Employment
effects on hospital privatization in Germany. Eur J
Health Econ. 2014;15(7):747–757.
32. Hollingsworth B. Non-parametric and parametric appli-
cations measuring efficiency in health care. Health Care
Manag Sci. 2003;6(4):203–218. :1026255523228
33. Tiemann O, Schrey€ogg J, Busse R. Hospital ownership
and efficiency: a review of studies with particular focus on
Germany. Health Policy. 2012;104(2):163–171.
34. Sibbel R, Nagarajah B. Are privately owned hospitals
more efficient? Results of a survey of the international
literature. Gesundheitswesen. 2012;74(6):379–386.
35. Kessler DP, McClellan MB. The effects of hospital own-
ership on medical productivity. Rand J Econ.
2002;33:488–506.
Jeurissen et al. 17
36. Horwitz JR, Nichols A. Hospital ownership and medical
services: market mix, spillover effects, and nonprofit
objectives. J Health Econ. 2009;28(5):924–937.
37. Horwitz JR, Nichols A. What do nonprots maximize?
Hospital service provision and market ownership mix.
NBER Working Paper 13246. Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Research; 2007.
38. Fox DM. Policy commercializing nonprofits in health: the
history of a paradox from the 19th century to the ACA.
Milbank Q. 2015;93(1):179–210.
39. Reinhardt UE. The economics of for-profit and not-for-
profit hospitals.Health Aff (Millwood). 2000;19(6):178–186.
40. Schneider H. Paying their way? Do nonprofit hospitals
justify their favorable tax treatment? Inquiry.
2007;44(2):187–199.
41. Stevens R. “A poor sort of memory”: voluntary hospitals
and government before the depression. Milbank Fund Q.
1982;60(4):551–584.
42. Robinson JC. Capital finance and ownership conversions
in health care. Health Aff (Millwood). 2000;19(1):56–71.
43. Ligon JA. The capital structure of hospitals and reim-
bursement policy. Q Rev Econ Financ. 1997;37(1):59–77.
44. Claxton G, Feder J, Shactman D, Altman S. Public policy
issues in nonprofit conversions: an overview. Health Aff
(Millwood). 1997;16(2):9–28.
45. Gray BH. Conversion of HMOs and hospitals: what’s at
stake? Health Aff (Millwood). 1997;16(2):29–47.
46. Goldsmith JC, Kaufman N, Burns L. The tangled
hospital-physician relationship. Health Aff (Millwood)
Blog. https://doi.org/10.1377/hblog20160509.054793.
Published 2016. Accessed October 7, 2020.
47. B€ohlke N, Gerlinger T, Mosebach K, Schmucker R,
Schulten T. Privatisierung von Krankenh€ausern.
Erfahrungen und Perspektiven aus Sicht der Besch€aftigten
[Privatization of hospitals. Experiences and perspectives
from employees]. Hamburg, Germany: VSA; 2009.
48. Rose-Ackerman S. Altruism, nonprofits, and economic
theory. J Econ Lit. 1996;34(2):701–728.
49. Statistics Netherlands (CBS). Medisch geschoolden;
arbeidspositie, positie in de werkkring, naar beroep
[Medically trained personnel; work position, position in
the workplace, by occupation]. https://opendata.cbs.nl/
statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/81551NED/table?ts=
1530009304397. Published 2019. Accessed February 24,
2020.
50. American Hospital Association (AHA). AHA annual
survey database for these fiscal years: 2000, 2005, 2007-
2015. Chicago, IL: AHA; 2017.
51. LaingBuisson. UK Healthcare Market Review. London,
England: LaingBuisson; 2019.
52. OECD. OECD Health Statistics 2019. Health Care
Resources. https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?Th
emeTreeId=9. Published 2019. Accessed January 23,
2020.
53. Statistisches Bundesamt. Gesundheit: Grunddaten der
Krankenh€auser [Health: Basic Data on Hospitals].
Wiesbaden, Germany: Statistisches Bundesamt; 2018.
54. CIBG. DigiMV (2007-2018) Annual Financial Reports
Health Care Providers. The Hague, the Netherlands:
CIBG; 2020.
55. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
Table 89. Hospitals, beds, and occupancy rates, by type
of ownership and size of hospital: United States, selected
years 1975–2015. Health, United States, 2017. https://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/2017/089.pdf. Published
2017. Accessed November 4, 2019.
56. Hawe E, Yuen P, Baillie L. OHE Guide to UK Health and
Health Care Statistics. London, England: Office of
Health Economics (OHE); 2011.
57. LaingBuisson. UK Healthcare Market Review London,
England: LaingBuisson; 2017.
58. Mayntz R, Rosewitz B. Ausdifferenzierung und
Strukturwandel des deutschen Gesundheitssystem
[Structural changes in German health care system]. In:
Mayntz R, Rosewitz B, Schimank U, Stichweh R, eds.
Differenzierung und Verselbst€andigung. Zur
Entwicklung gesellschaftlicher Teilsysteme [Pluralism
and privatization, on the development of social systems].
Frankfurt, Germany: Campus Verlag; 1988.
59. Abel-Smith B. The Hospitals 1800–1948. A Study in Social
Administration in England and Wales. London, England:
Heineman; 1964.
60. Navarro V. Why some countries have national-health
insurance, others have national-health services, and the
United-States has neither. Soc Sci Med.
1989;28(9):887–898.
61. Kinkead BM. Medicare payment and hospital capital: the
evolution of policy. Health Aff (Millwood).
1984;3(3):49–74.
62. Stevens R. In Sickness and in Wealth. American Hospitals
in the Twentieth Century. Baltimore, MD: The Johns
Hopkins University Press; 1999.
63. Chung AP, Gaynor M, Richards-Shubik S. Subsidies and
structure: the lasting impact of the Hill-Burton Program
on the hospital industry. NBER Working Paper Series.
2016:1–94.
64. Gray BH. For-Profit Enterprise in Health Care.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press; 1986.
65. U.S. General Accounting Office. Hospital merger
increased Medicare and Medicaid payments for capital
costs. In: Report by the Comptroller General to the
Honorable Willis D Gradison Jr, House of
Representatives. Washington, DC: General Accounting
Office; 1983.
66. Valvona J, Sloan FA. Hospital profitability and capital
structure: a comparative analysis. Health Serv Res.
1988;23(3):343.
67. General Accounting Office. Hospital merger increased
Medicare and Medicaid payments for capital costs,
Report By The Comptroller General To The
Honourable Willis D. Gradison, Jr. House of
Representatives. Washington, DC: General Accounting
Office; 1983.
68. General Accounting Office. Health: The Effects of
Changes in Provider Ownership on Capital Cost.
Washington, DC: General Accounting Office; 1984.
Report number: 123697.
69. Scott SJ. The Medicare prospective payment system. Am
J Occup Ther. 1984;38(5):330–334.
18 International Journal of Health Services 0(0)
70. Oberlander J. The Political Life of Medicare. Chicago, IL:
The University of Chicago Press; 2003.
71. Himmelstein DU, Woolhandler S, Harnly M, et al.
Patient transfers: medical practice as social triage. Am J
Public Health. 1984;74(5):494–497.
72. Kellermann AL, Martinez R. The ER, 50 years on. N
Engl J Med. 2011;364(24):2278–2279.
73. Gray BH. The Profit Motive and Patient Care: The
Changing Accountability of Doctors and Hospitals
(Twentieth Century Fund Report). Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press; 1991.
74. Zwanziger J, Melnick GA. Can managed care plans con-
trol health care costs? Health Aff (Millwood).
1996;15(2):185–199.
75. Cutler DM. The Changing Hospital Industry, Comparing
Not-for-Profit and For-Profit Institutions. Chicago, IL:
The University of Chicago Press; 2000.
76. Silvers JB. The role of capital markets in restructuring
health care. J Health Polit Policy Law.
2001;26(5):1019–1030.
77. Rodwin MA. Backlash as prelude to managing managed
care. J Health Polit Policy Law. 1999;24(5):1115–1126.
78. Silverman E, Skinner J. Medicare upcoding and hospital
ownership. J Health Econ. 2004;23:369–389.
79. U.S. Department of Justice. HCA – The Health Care
Company & Subsidiaries to Pay $840 Million to Criminal
Fines and Civil Damages and Penalties. Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Justice; 2000.
80. Baser O, Fan ZH, Dimick JB, Staiger DO, Birkmeyer JD.
Outlier payments for cardiac surgery and hospital quality.
Health Aff (Millwood). 2009;28(4):1154–1160.
81. Moynihan R. Another US healthcare giant is hit by scan-
dal. BMJ. 2003;327(7424):1128–1128.
82. Kane CK. Updated Data on Physician Practice
Arrangements: For the First Time, Fewer Physicians are
Owners Than Employees. Chicago, IL: American Medical
Association; 2019.
83. Iglehart JK. The emergence of physician-owned specialty
hospitals. N Engl J Med. 2005:78–84.
84. United States Department of Health and Human
Services. Final Report to the Congress and Strategic and
Implementing Plan Required Under Section 5006 of the
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. Washington, DC:
Department of Health and Human Services; 2006.
85. Johns Hopkins Nonprofit Economic Data
Project. Published 2020. Accessed March 18, 2020
86. Quentin W, Geissler A, Wittenbecher F, et al. Paying
hospital specialists: experiences and lessons from eight
high-income countries. Health Policy.
2018;122(5):473–484.
87. Rodwin MA. Medical commerce, physician entrepreneur-
ialism, and conflicts of interest. Camb Q Healthc Ethic.
2007;16(4):387–397.
88. US Census Bureau. Health Insurance Coverage in the
United States: 2016. https://www2.census.gov/programs-
surveys/demo/tables/health-insurance/time-series/acs/h
ic04_acs.xls. Published 2017. Accessed February 9, 2020.
89. Rosko M, Goddard J, Al-Amin M, Tavakoli M.
Predictors of hospital profitability: a panel study
including the early years of the ACA. J Health Care
Finance. 2018;44(3):1–23.
90. Colla CH, Lewis VA, Tierney E, Muhlestein DB.
Hospitals participating in ACOs tend to be large and
urban, allowing access to capital and data. Health Aff
(Millwood). 2016;35(3):431–439.
91. American Hospital Association. Trendwatch Chartbook
2018. Trends Affecting Hospitals and Health Systems.
Washington: American Hospital Association; 2018.
92. Ly DP, Cutler DM. Factors of US hospitals associated
with improved profit margins: an observational study. J
Gen Intern Med. 2018;33(7):1020–1027.
93. Plummer E, Wempe W. The Affordable Care Act’s effects
on the formation, expansion, and operation of physician-
owned hospitals. Health Aff (Millwood).
2016;35(8):1452–1460.
94. Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC).
Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy.
Washington, DC: MedPAC; 2017.
95. Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC).
Report to the Congress. Medicare Payment Policy.
Washington, DC: MedPAC; 2019.
96. Bureau van Dijk. Orbis database. https://orbis.bvdinfo.
com. Published 2020. Accessed February 10, 2020.
97. HCA Holdings Inc. Annual Report to Shareholders.
Nashville, TN: HCA Healthcare; 2018.
98. HCA Holdings Inc. Annual Report to Shareholders.
Nashville, TN: HCA Healthcare; 2013.
99. HCA Holdings Inc. Annual Report to Shareholders.
Nashville, TN: HCA Healthcare; 2011.
100. Universal Health Services (UHS) Inc. Annual Report.
King of Prussia, PA: UHS; 2015.
101. Universal Health Services (UHS) Inc. Annual Report.
King of Prussia, PA: UHS; 2013.
102. Universal Health Services (UHS) Inc. Annual Report.
King of Prussia, PA: UHS; 2010.
103. Universal Health Services (UHS) Inc. Annual Report.
King of Prussia, PA: UHS; 2018.
104. Tenet Healthcare Corporation. Financial Annual Report.
Dallas, TX: Tenet Healthcare Corporation; 2010.
105. Tenet Healthcare Corporation. Financial Annual Report.
Dallas, TX: Tenet Healthcare Corporation; 2013.
106. Tenet Healthcare Corporation. Financial Annual Report.
Dallas, TX: Tenet Healthcare Corporation; 2015.
107. Tenet Healthcare Corporation. Financial Annual Report.
Dallas, TX: Tenet Healthcare Corporation; 2018.
108. Glied S. Implications of the 2017 tax cuts and jobs act for
public health. Am J Public Health. 2018;108(6):734–736.
109. Moody’s. Tax Overhaul Will Boost Cash Flow for Many
For-Profit Hospitals. New York City, NY: Moody’s
Investors Service; 2018.
110. Moody’s. Healthcare Quarterly. New York City, NY:
Moody’s Investors Service; 2020.
111. Kruse FM, Jeurissen PPT. For-profit hospitals out of
business? Financial sustainability during the COVID-19
epidemic emergency response. Int J Health Policy Manag.
2020;9(10):423–428.
112. Bebinger M. COVID-19 hits some health care
workers with pay cuts and layoffs. https://www.npr.org/
Jeurissen et al. 19
sections/health-shots/2020/04/02/826232423/covid-19-h
its-some-health-care-workers-with-pay-cuts-and-layoffs?
t=1589192047503. Published 2020. Accessed May 11,
2020.
113. Guy M. Between ‘going private’ and ‘NHS privatisation’:
patient choice, competition reforms and the relationship
between the NHS and private healthcare in England.
Legal Stud. 2019;39(3):479–498.
114. Jewkes J, Jewkes S. The Genesis of the British National
Health Service. Oxford, England: Blackwell; 1961.
115. McSmith A. The birth of the NHS. Independent. https://
www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/fea
tures/the-birth-of-the-nhs-856091.html. Published 2008.
Accessed October 7, 2020.
116. Vayda E. Private practice in the United Kingdom. J
Public Health Policy. 1983;4(2):222–234.
117. Calnan M, Cant S, Grabe J. Going Private, Why People
Pay for Their Health Care. Philadelphia, PA: Open
University Press; 1993.
118. Lee M. Private and National Health Services. London,
England: Policy Studies Institute; 1978.
119. Chandra J, Kakabadse A. Privatisation and the NHS.
London, England: Gower; 1985.
120. Robb D, Brown P. BUPA 1968-198: A Continuing
History. London, England: BUPA; 1984.
121. Griffiths R. NHS Management Inquiry. London, England:
Department of Health and Social Security; 1983.
122. HM Government. Working for Patients (White Paper).
London, England: HMSO; 1989.
123. Griffith B, Rayner G, Mohan J. Commercial Medicine in
London. London, England: Greater London Council;
1985.
124. LaingBuisson. Laing’s Healthcare Market Review 2003–
2004. Suffolk, England: William Clowes Ltd; 2003.
125. National Audit Office. The NHS and Independent
Hospitals. London, England: HM Stationary Office; 1989.
126. Laing W. UK Private Specialists’ Fees – Is the Price
Right? Norwich, England: Norwich Union Healthcare;
1992.
127. LaingBuisson. Laing’s Healthcare Market Review 2010-
2011. London, England: LaingBuisson; 2011.
128. Ramsay S. Some UK hospitals have very private suc-
cesses. Lancet. 1995;346(8972):431.
129. Hunter DJ. The Health Debate. Bristol, England:
University of Bristol, The Policy Press; 2008.
130. National Audit Office. Managing NHS Hospital
Consultants. London, England: Department of Health;
2013. Report number: HC 885. SESSION 2012–13.
131. House of Commons. Health – Third Report. London,
England: Health Committee Publications; 2000.
132. Commission on the Future of Health and Social Care in
England. The UK Private Health Market. London,
England: The King’s Fund; 2014.
133. Pollock A. Independent sector treatment centres: evidence
so far. BMJ. 2008;336:421–424.
134. House of Commons Health Committee. Independent
Sector Treatment Centres. Fourth Report of Session
2005–06. London, England: The Stationery Office
Limited; 2006.
135. Dash P. New providers in UK healthcare. BMJ.
2004;328:340–342.
136. Ramsay Health Care Limited. Annual Report 2019.
Sydney, Australia: Ramsay Health Care Limited; 2019.
137. Ramsay Health Care Limited. Annual Report 2017.
Sydney, Australia: Ramsay Health Care Limited; 2017.
138. Ramsay Health Care Limited. Annual Report 2015.
Sydney, Australia: Ramsay Health Care Limited; 2015.
139. Spire Healthcare. Annual Report. London, England: Spire
Healthcare Group; 2014.
140. Spire Healthcare. Annual Report. London, England: Spire
Healthcare Group; 2016.
141. Spire Healthcare. Annual Report. London, England: Spire
Healthcare Group; 2018.
142. HM Government. The Coalition: Our Programme for
Government. London, England: Cabinet Office; 2010.
143. Ham C, Baird B, Gregory S, Jabbal J, Alderwick H. The
NHS Under the Coalition Government. Part One: NHS
Reform. London, England: The King’s Fund; 2015.
144. Lacobucci G. A third of NHS contracts awarded since
health act have gone to private sector. BMJ investigation
shows. BMJ. 2014;349:1–6.
145. Appleby J. Pay in the NHS: who earns what? BMJ.
2015;351:h6250.
146. British Medical Association (BMA). Privatisation and
Independent Sector Provision in the NHS. London,
England: BMA; 2018.
147. Anderson M, Cherla A, Wharton G, Mossialos E.
Improving transparency and performance of private hos-
pitals. BMJ. 2020;368:m577.
148. NHS. The NHS Long Term Plan. London, England:
NHS; 2019.
149. EuroMOMO. Graphs and maps. Z-scores by country.
https://www.euromomo.eu/graphs-and-maps#z-scores-
by-country. Published 2020. Accessed July 17, 2020.
150. National Audit Office. Review of Capital Expenditure in
the NHS. London, England: Department of Health &
Social Care; 2020.
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privater Tr€agerschaft [Private hospitals]. Essen,
Germany: RWI; 2015.
180. Augurzky B, Beivers A, Gülker R. Krankenh€auser in
privater Tr€agerschaft [Private hospitals]. Essen,
Germany: RWI; 2012.
181. Kifmann M. Competition policy for health care provision
in Germany. Health Policy. 2017;121(2):119–125.
182. Wagner DJ. Tarievenbeleid. Enkele aspecten ten aanzien
van de intramurale gezondheidszorg [Renumeration
policy. Some issues regarding hospital services]. In:
Baay JH, ed. In het kader van de gezondheidszorg.
Lochem, the Netherlands: De Tijdstroom; 1978.
183. van Straaten HC. Eigen vermogen in de gezondheidszorg.
Vervangingswaarde, rente over eigen vermogen, verliesfi-
nanciering [Equity in health care. Capital budgetting,
interest on equity, and the financing of losses]. In: de
Wolff LJ, ed. De prijs voor gezondheid, het Centraal
Orgaan Ziekenhuistarieven 1965–1982 [The Price for
Health, the Agency for Hospital Renumeration 1965–
1982]. Baarn, the Netherlands: Ambo; 1984.
Jeurissen et al. 21
184. Sijmons JG. Aanbodregulering en de Wet toelating zorgin-
stellingen [Supply-Regulations and the Regulations for
Certificate-of-Need Procedures]. The Hague, the
Netherlands: SDU; 2006.
185. Maarse H, Jeurissen P, Ruwaard D. Results of the
market-oriented reform in the Netherlands: a review.
Health Econ Policy Law. 2016;11(2):161–178.
186. Plomp E. Winst in de zorg. Juridische aspecten van win-
stuitkering door zorginstellingen [Profit in healthcare.
Legal aspects of profit distribution by healthcare institu-
tions]. Dissertation. The Hague, the Netherlands: SDU;
2011.
187. Berden B, Houwen L, Stevens S. Inleiding: financierings-
modellen en privaat kapitaal [Introduction: financing
models and private capital]. In: Financiering van zorgin-
stellingen. Met speciale aandacht voor de medisch-
specialistische zorg [Financing of Health Care
Organisation. With Special Attention to the Medical
Care Sector]. Deventer, the Netherlands: Vakmedianet;
2015.
188. Klink A. Positionering algemene ziekenhuizen [Letter
From the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport to the
House of Representative. Positioning General Hospitals].
The Hague, the Netherlands: Tweede Kamer der Staten-
Generaal; 2008. Report number: 27 295, nr. 126.
189. Bruins BJ. Faillissement MC Slotervaart en MC
IJsselmeerziekenhuizen [Letter From the Minister of
Health, Welfare and Sport to the House of
Representative. Bankruptcies MC Slotervaart and MC
IJsselmeerziekenhuizen]. The Hague, the Netherlands:
Ministerie van Volksgezondheid Welzijn en Sport; 2018.
Report number: 1438779-183328-PZO.
190. van Manen J, Meurs P, van Twist M. De aangekondigde
ondergang. Onderzoek naar de faillissementen van het MC
Slotervaart en de MC IJsselmeerziekenhuizen [The
Announced Downfall. Research on the Bankruptcies of
MC Slotervaart and MC IJsselmeer Hospitals]. The
Hague, the Netherlands: Commissie onderzoek faillisse-
menten ziekenhuizen; 2020.
191. BDO. BDO-Benchmark ziekenhuizen 2018. Zorginfarct
dreigt ‘Sector vereist radicaal nieuw businessmodel’ [A
Health Care Infarct Is Looming. ‘The Sector Requires a
Radically New Business Model’]. The Hague, the
Netherlands: BDO; 2018.
192. Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Wijziging van de Wet
toelating zorginstellingen en enkele andere wetten teneinde
investeringsmogelijkheden in medisch-specialistische zorg te
bevorderen (Wet vergroten investeringsmogelijkheden in
medisch-specialistische zorg) [Law to Increase
Opportunities for Investors in the Medical Care Sector].
The Hague, the Netherlands: Eerste Kamer der Staten-
Generaal; 2014. Report number: 33 168, A.
193. Schippers EI. Wijziging van de Wet toelating zorginstellin-
gen en enkele andere wetten om het mogelijk te maken dat
aanbieders van medisch-specialistische zorg, mits zij aan
een aantal voorwaarden voldoen, winst uitkeren (voorwaar-
den voor winstuitkering aanbieders medisch-specialistische
zorg). Brief van de minister van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn
en Sport. [Letter From the Minister of Health, Welfare
and Sport to the House of Representative. Conditions to
Allocate Profits for Medical Care Providers]. The Hague,
the Netherlands: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal;
2014. Report number: 33 168, nr. 15.
194. Visser J. Schippers haalt wetsvoorstel winstuitkering
terug [Schippers withdraws the legislation to lift the for-
profit ban]. https://www.medischcontact.nl/nieuws/
laatste-nieuws/artikel/schippers-haalt-wetsvoorstel-win
stuitkering-terug.htm. Published 2014. Accessed October
7, 2020.
195. de Jong HM, Bruins BJ, Blokhuis P.Wijziging van de Wet
toelating zorginstellingen en enkele andere wetten teneinde
investeringsmogelijkheden in medisch- specialistische zorg
te bevorderen (Wet vergroten investeringsmogelijkheden
in medisch-specialistische zorg) [Letter From the
Ministers and State Secretary of the Ministry of Health,
Welfare and Sport to the House of Representatives]. The
Hague, the Netherlands: Eerste Kamer der Staten-
Generaal; 2018:33168, J.
196. de Jong HM. Fraudebestrijding in de zorg [Letter From
the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport: Combating
Fraud in Health Care]. The Hague, the Netherlands:
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal; 2019:8 828, nr. 115.
197. Bruins BJ. Wijziging van de Wet toelating zorginstellingen
en enkele andere wetten teneinde investeringsmogelijkheden
in medisch-specialistische zorg te bevorderen (Wet vergro-
ten investeringsmogelijkheden in medisch-specialistische
zorg) [Letter of the Minister of Medical Care and
Sport]. The Hague, the Netherlands: Eerste Kamer der
Staten-Generaal; 2019. Report number: 33 168, P
Herdruk.
198. Gupta Strategists. Het ‘Kjeld Nuis’-effect voor ziekenhui-
zen: Empirische studie naar hoe ziekenhuizen in 4jaar van
‘niks, ‘solvabiliteitsgoud’ halen [Empirical Study on How
Hospitals Transformed From Zero to Gold Within 4
Years]. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Gupta Strategists;
2018.
199. Het Financieele Dagblad. Winsttrucs zijn overal in de zorg
[Tricks to generate profits are everywhere in the health
care sector]. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Het
Financieele Dagblad; 2017.
200. Schmid A, Ulrich V. Consolidation and concentration in
the German hospital market: the two sides of the coin.
Health Policy. 2013;109(3):301–310.
201. Appelbaum E, Batt R. Private Equity Buyouts in
Healthcare: Who Wins, Who Loses? New York, NY:
Institute for New Economic Thinking; 2020.
Author Biographies
Patrick P. T. Jeurissen is a professor of Sustainable
Healthcare Systems at the Radboud University
Medical Centre in Nijmegen (The Netherlands). He
also works as a scientific advisor for the Dutch
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport. He is also cur-
rently part of the steering committee of the health divi-
sion of the OECD. He studied Public Administration at
the Erasmus University Rotterdam and at Indiana
University. In 2017, he obtained his PhD from
22 International Journal of Health Services 0(0)
Erasmus University. Prior to his appointment at the
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, he worked for
The Council of Public Health & Society (Raad voor
Volksgezondheid en Zorg) and the Erasmus Medical
Centre.
Florien M. Kruse holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP)
degree from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin.
She is currently a PhD candidate at the Radboud
University Medical Centre in Nijmegen, in the
Netherlands. Her PhD project focuses on the added
value and ethical considerations of business-oriented
health care providers. Previously she has worked as a
trainee at the European Foundation in Dublin, and as
intern for the Pan American Health Organisation in
Paramaribo (Surinam) and the Max Planck Institute
for Demographic Research in Rostock (Germany).
Reinhard Busse is a distinguished professor and the
Department Head for Healthcare Management in the
Faculty of Economics and Management at Technische
Universit€at Berlin, Germany. He is also Co-Director and
Head of the Berlin hub of the European Observatory on
Health Systems and Policies and he is Editor-in-Chief of
the international peer-reviewed journal Health Policy.
Professor Reinhard Busse studied medicine in
Marburg, Boston and London as well as Public Health
in Hannover. Prior to his position at the TU Berlin in
2002, he was head of the Observatory hub in Madrid, a
senior research fellow in the Department of
Epidemiology, Social Medicine and Health Systems
Research, a resident physician in the Department of
Rheumatology, both at Hannover Medical School, and
a researcher in the Planning Group for a Problem-based
Medical Curriculum at the Free University of Berlin. In
1993, he earned a PhD in Medicine from Philipps
University in Marburg.
David U. Himmelstein is a distinguished professor of
public health at the City University of New York’s
Hunter College, a lecturer in medicine at Harvard
Medical School, and a staff physician at Montefiore
Medical Center in the Bronx. He graduated from
Columbia University’s College of Physicians and
Surgeons and completed an internal medicine residency
at Highland Hospital in Oakland, California, and a fel-
lowship in general internal medicine at Harvard. He
practiced primary care internal medicine and served as
the chief of social and community medicine at
Cambridge Hospital/Harvard Medical School. He
cofounded Physicians for a National Health Program,
whose 23,000 members advocate for nonprofit, single-
payer national health insurance.
Elias Mossialos is Brian Abel-Smith Professor of Health
Policy, Deputy Head of Department of Health Policy
and Director of LSE Health. He founded LSE Health
in 1996. He is also the Co-Director of the European
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. He has
served as an advisor to several agencies including
WHO, the European Parliament, the European
Commission, and Ministries of Health and Social
Affairs of various countries. In 2010, he was awarded
the Andrija Stampar Medal by the Association of
Schools of Public Health in Europe (ASPHER), for con-
tributions to European public health. He received the
2002 and 2007 Baxter Awards from the European
Health Management Association for the best publica-
tion in health policy and management in Europe and a
Commended Prize in the 2002 BMA Medical Book
Competition.
Steffie Woolhandler is a distinguished professor at the
City University of New York’s Hunter College, a prima-
ry care doctor in the South Bronx, and a lecturer in
medicine at Harvard Medical School, where she was for-
merly a professor of medicine. A native of Louisiana, she
graduated from Louisiana State University Medical
School in New Orleans and completed an internal med-
icine residency at Cambridge Hospital and a research
fellowship in general internal medicine at Harvard. She
cofounded Physicians for a National Health Program.
Jeurissen et al. 23
